National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)

Australia
English
SUBMITTED

Section 1: National coordination infrastructure

Sources	Question	Yes	No	Developing
	National Coordination Body/Mechanism			
[PoA II.4]	1.1. Has your country established a National Coordination Body/Mechanism or other body that includes SALW control in its core tasks? [if no, go to 1.2]			
	a) Name of body/mechanism:			
	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade			
	b) Address:			
	RG Casey Building, John McEwen Cr, Barton ACT, 0221, Australia			
	c) Contact details:			
	[Mr/Ms.]			
	Mr.			
	i) Contact person:			
	Director, Conventional Weapons Section and Defence Exports Section			
	ii) Telephone:			
	+61 2 6261 1111			
	iii) Email:			
	James.Nachipo@dfat.gov.au			
	d) Composition:			
	i) Number of men:			
	1			
	ii) Number of women:			
	3			
	National Point of Contact			
[PoA II.5, 24]	1.2. Does your country have a National Point of Contact designated to act as a liaison on matters relating to the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA)? [if no, go to 1.2.3]			
	1.2.1. Details:			
	[Mr/Ms.]			
	Mr.			
	a) Name:			
	Director, Conventional Weapons and Defence Section			
	b) Organization or agency:			
	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade			
	c) Address:			

	RG Casey Building, John McEwen Cr, Barton ACT, 0221, Australia			
	d) Telephone:			
	+61 2 6261 1111			
	e) Email:			
	James.Nachipo@dfat.gov.au			
[ITI 25]	1.2.2. Is the National Point of Contact identified above also responsible for exchanging information and liaising on matters relating to the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)?		\subseteq	
[ITI 25]	1.2.3. If the answer to Question 1.2.2 is 'no', does your country have a National Point of Contact for purposes of exchanging information and liaising on all matters relating to the ITI?	\checkmark		
	If yes, provide details:			
	[Mr./Ms.]			
	Mr.			
	a) Name:			
	Gary Fleetwood, Manager, National Firearm Identification and Trace Program			
	b) Organization or agency:			
	Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission			
	c) Address:			
	GPO Box 2411, ADELAIDE, SA 5061			
	d) Telephone:			
	+61 8 8217 6329			
	e) Email:			
	gary.fleetwood@acic.gov.au			
	National Action Plan			
[RevCon3 outcome II.A.5.60]	1.3. Does your country have a National Action Plan on SALW? [possible to upload relevant files in Section 10]	\checkmark		
	National targets			
	1.4. Has your country set national targets relating to the implementation of the PoA and ITI?			
	1.4.1. If so, describe			
	See National Firearms Agreement (attached in Section 10)			
	Target year:			

Section 2: Manufacture

Sources	Question	Yes	No
	Laws, regulations and administrative procedures		
	2.1. Are there any SALW manufactured in your country? [if no, go to 2.2]	\square	
[PoA II.2]	2.1.1. Does your country have laws, regulations and/or administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the manufacture of SALW? [if no, go to 2.1.2]	\subseteq	
	2.1.1.1. List laws, regulations and/or administrative procedures regulating the manufacture of SALW in your country:		
	Firearms Acts and Regulations in each state and territory		
	2.1.1.2. Does your country license the manufacture of SALW?	\subseteq	
[PoA II.3]	2.1.1.3. Is illegal manufacture of SALW considered a criminal offence in your country?	\subseteq	
	Marking and manufacture		
[PoA II.7: ITI 8a]	2.2. Does your country require that SALW be marked at the time of manufacture? [if no, go to 2.3]	\subseteq	
[ITI 8a]	2.2.1. What information is included in the marking (check relevant boxes)?		
	a) Name of the manufacturer	\subseteq	
	b) Country of manufacture		
	c) Serial number	\subseteq	
	d) Year of manufacture	\subseteq	
	e) Weapon type/model	\subseteq	
	f) Caliber	\subseteq	
	g) Other:	\subseteq	
	[if other, please explain]		
	All states, territories and the federal government work in unison through the Firearm and Weapons Policy Working Group (FWPWG) to coordinate uniform minimum standards on firearm management throughout Australia.		
[ITI 10a]	2.2.2. What part of the SALW is marked?		
	It is generally the receiver of the firearm that is marked. Australian Defence Force (ADF) weapons are marked in accordance with ADF requirements against the Weapons Specification.		
	2.2.3. Are there exceptions to the requirement to mark SALW at the time of manufacture?		\checkmark
	2.2.3.1. If so, describe:		

Record-keeping by manufacturers

[PoA II.9: ITI 11]	$2.3.\mathrm{Does}$ your country require that manufacturers keep records of their activities? [if no, go to $2.4.4$]	\subseteq	
[ITI 12a]	2.3.1. What information must be recorded (check relevant boxes)?		
	a) Quantity of SALW manufactured	\checkmark	
	b) Type or model of SALW manufactured	\checkmark	
	c) Markings applied to manufactured SALW	\checkmark	
	d) Transactions (e.g. sales of manufactured and marked SALW)	\checkmark	
	e) Other:	\checkmark	
	[if other, please explain]		
	All firearms in Australia must be registered and all persons in possession of a firearm (other than government agencies) must be licensed to have that firearm in their possession.		
[ITI 12a]	2.3.2. How long must manufacturing records be kept?		
	Other		
	[if other, please explain]		
	The period of time records must be kept by the dealer varies from state to state, but usually for the time the dealer is in business. The Australia 2017 National Firearms Agreement requires all firearms in private possession to be registered and law enforcement agencies maintain those (and other) firearms records indefinitely.		
	Actions taken during the reporting period		
[PoA II.6]	2.4. During the reporting period, was action taken against groups or individuals engaged in illegal manufacturing of SALW (e.g. craft manufacturing)? [if no, go to 2.5]	\checkmark	
	2.4.1. Details (e.g. prosecution): [if yes]		
	Prosecution of individuals for the manufacture of illicit firearms.		
	International assistance		
[PoA III.6]	2.5. Does your country wish to request assistance in developing laws, regulations and/or administrative procedures regarding SALW manufacture? [if no, go to 3.1]		
	2.5.1. If yes, what kind of assistance do you require?		
	2.5.2. Has your country developed a project proposal for assistance in this regard? [possible to upload relevant files in Section 10]		

Section	3.	Intornat	ional	transfers
Section		ımternat	ionai	transfers

Sources	Question	Yes	No
	Laws, regulations and administrative procedures		
[PoA II.2, 12]	3.1. Does your country have laws, regulations or administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the export, import, transit or retransfer of SALW? [if no, go to 3.2]	\checkmark	
[PoA II.11]	3.1.1. List laws, regulations or administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the export, import, transit or retransfer of SALW.		
	Customs Act 1901, Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956, Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958, Customs Act 1901 and Defence Trade Controls Act 2012. Defence Export Controls (DEC) within the Department of Defence administers Australia's export control legislation relating to defence and dual-use goods and technology. DEC provides policy on export control, and is responsible for assessing applications to export defence and strategic goods and technology.		
	DEC issues export permissions, denials, import certificates and end-user documentation. Australia's export control policies reflect the Government's commitment to ensure the export of defence and dual-use goods is consistent with Australia's national interests, international obligations and commitments. Australia is a member of the following international export control regimes; Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Arms Trade Treaty.		
	Licensing and authorisation		
[PoA II.11]	3.2. Does a person or an entity who transfers SALW require a licence or other form of authorisation to transfer SALW from/into your country?	\subseteq	
	Licensing and authorisation		
[PoA II.3]	3.3. Is it a criminal offence to trade SALW without a licence or authorisation, or to do so in a manner that is in contradiction to the terms of a licence or authorisation, in your country?	\checkmark	
	Licensing and authorisation		
[PoA II.11]	3.4. What kind of documentation does your country require prior to authorising an export of SALW to another country?		
[PoA II.12]	a) An end-user certificate (EUC) from the importing country. [if no, go to 3.4 b]	\checkmark	
	i) What elements does an end-user certificate in your country contain (check relevant boxes)?		
	1) Detailed description (type, quantity, characteristics) of the SALW or technology	\checkmark	
	2) Contract number or order reference and date		
	3) Final destination country	\checkmark	
	4) Description of the end-use of the SALW	\subseteq	

5) Exporter's details (name, address and business name)	\subseteq	
6) End-user information (name, position, full address and original signature)	\checkmark	
7) Information on other parties involved in the transaction	\checkmark	
8) Certification by the relevant government authorities of the authenticity of the end-user	\checkmark	
9) Date of issue	\checkmark	
10) Other:	\checkmark	
[if other, please explain]		
Purchase order, international import certificate.		
b) Other types of end-user documentation:		
A simplified permit may be issued to an individual for the export of lower risk firearms, where there is no transfer of ownership, for the purposes of taking part in overseas sporting shooters events, hunting or for protection in international waters. Exemptions exist for: • SALW owned by certain listed defence forces when those goods are imported by the defence force (or a member of the defence force) and then exported by the defence force (or a member of the defence force);		
• air security officers (in certain circumstances); • SALW exported under the Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia.		
Licensing and authorisation		
3.5. Does your country verify or seek to authenticate EUCs or other types of end-user documentation provided? [if no, go to 3.6]	\checkmark	
3.5.1. Details: [if yes]		
Australia requires end-user certification be provided on Australian-formatted certificates, or under official entity/ company letterhead, and conducts open-source checks of receiving entities.		
Licensing and authorisation		
3.6. Does your country have measures in place aimed at preventing the forgery and misuse of EUCs or other types of end-user documentation?	\checkmark	
3.6.1. Details: [if yes]		
The Australian Commonwealth Government and some states and territories have legal provisions relating to forgery/misuse of records/documents. Some states and territories have in place adminstrative processes to reduce the likelihood of forged or misused documents being accepted.		
Post-delivery controls		
3.7. When exporting, does your country require a Delivery Verification Certificate (DVC) to confirm that SALW have reached their intended end-user or intended importer in the importing State?		riangle
Post-delivery controls		
3.8. After exporting, does your country verify or seek to authenticate DVCs provided?		\subseteq
3.8.1. Details: [if yes]		
	6) End-user information (name, position, full address and original signature) 7) Information on other parties involved in the transaction 8) Certification by the relevant government authorities of the authenticity of the end-user 9) Date of issue 10) Other: [if other, please explain] Purchase order, international import certificate. b) Other types of end-user documentation: A simplified permit may be issued to an individual for the export of lower risk firearms, where there is no transfer of ownership, for the purposes of taking part in overseas sporting shooters events, hunting or for protection in international waters. Exemptions exist for * \$ALW owned by certain listed defence forces when those goods are imported by the defence force (or a member of the defence force) and then exported by the defence force (or a member of the defence force): **air security officers (in certain circumstances); * \$ALW exported under the Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia. **Licensing and authorisation** 3.5. Does your country verify or seek to authenticate EUCs or other types of end-user documentation provided? [if no, go to 3.6] 3.5.1. Details: [if yes] Australia requires end-user certification be provided on Australian-formatted certificates, or under official entity/ company letterhead, and conducts open-source checks of receiving entities. **Licensing and authorisation** 3.6. Does your country have measures in place aimed at preventing the forgery and misuse of EUCs or other types of end-user documentation? 3.6.1. Details: [if yes] The Australian Commonwealth Government and some states and territories have legal provisions relating to forgery/misuse of records/documents. Some states and territories have in place administrative processes to reduce the likelihood of forged or misused documents being accepted. Post-delivery controls 3.7. When exporting, does your country require a Delivery Verification Certificate (DVC) to confirm that \$ALW have reached their intended end-user or	6) End-user information (name, position, full address and original signature) 7) Information on other parties involved in the transaction 8) Certification by the relevant government authorities of the authenticity of the end-user 9) Date of issue 10) Other: [if other, please explain] Purchase order, international import certificate. b) Other types of end-user documentation: A simplified permit may be issued to an individual for the export of lower risk firearms, where there is no transfer of ownership, for the purposes of taking part in overseas sporting shooters events, hunting or for protection in international waters. Exemptions exist for: • SALW owned by certain listed defence forces when those goods are imported by the defence force (or a member of the defence force) and then exported by the defence force (or a member of the defence force) and then exported by the defence force (or a member of the defence force): • air security officers (in certain circumstances); • SALW exported under the Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty between the United States and Australia. Licensing and authorisation 3.5. Does your country verify or seek to authenticate EUCs or other types of end-user documentation provided? [if no, go to 3.6] 3.5.1. Details: [if yes] Australia requires end-user certification be provided on Australian-formatted certificates, or under official entity/ company letterhead, and conducts open-source checks of receiving entities. Licensing and authorisation 3.6. Does your country have measures in place aimed at preventing the forgery and misuse of EUCs or other types of end-user documentation? 3.6.1. Details: [if yes] The Australian Commonwealth Government and some states and territories have legal provisions relating to forgery/misuse of records/documents. Some states and territories have legal provisions relating to forgery/misuse of records/documents. Some states and territories have legal provisions relating to forgery/misuse of records/documents. Some states and territories have legal provisio

	Post-delivery controls		
	3.9. When importing, does your country grant the right to the exporting State to conduct a physical check at the point of delivery?		~
	Marking at import		
[ITI 8b]	3.10. Does your country require that SALW imported into your country be marked at the time of import? [if no, go to 3.11]	\subseteq	
	3.10.1. Who is responsible for marking the SALW?		
	If the imported firearm requires marking to comply with Australian import regulations the marking is undertaken by the importer.		
	3.10.2. What information is included in the marking on import (check relevant boxes)?		
	a) Country of import		
	b) Year of import		
	c) Other:	\subseteq	
	[if other, please explain]		
	A serial number unique to that make and model firearm shall be applied if the firearm does not have a number.		
	3.10.3. Are there exceptions to the requirement to mark imported SALW?		\checkmark
	3.10.3.1. If so, describe:		
	3.10.4. If marked SALW imported into your country do not bear a unique marking when they arrive, does your country require that they be given such a marking?	\subseteq	
	3.10.4.1. Details: [if yes]		
	Australia requires a unique (to that make and model of firearm) serial number to be placed on the firearm. Australia is currently introducing to Federal Parliament changes to the Customs Regulations which will enhance clarity to the marking process. This will include the format of the serial number and other changes which will support the criteria defined within the ITI.		
	Record keeping		
[PoA II.9: ITI 12]	3.11. Does your country require that exporters and importers of SALW keep records of their activities? [if no, go to 3.12]	\subseteq	
	3.11.1. What information must be recorded (check relevant boxes)?		
	a) Quantity of SALW traded		
	b) Type or model of SALW traded		
	c) Markings appearing on transferred SALW	\subseteq	
	d) Transactions	\checkmark	
	i) Identity of buyer/seller		
	ii) Country SALW are to be delivered to or purchased from		

	iii) Date of delivery		
	e) Other:	\subseteq	
	[if other, please explain]		
	The markings record the make, model, serial number and cartridge designation.		
	3.11.2 How long must records of transfers be kept?		
	Other		
	[if other, please explain]		
	The period of time records must be kept varies from state to state, but usually for as long as the dealer is in business. Australia requires all firearms to be registered and this register is maintained indefinitely.		
	Diversion		
[RevCon3 outcome II. A.1(c)20]	3.12. Does your country collect information on domestic incidents of diversion related to international transfers?	\checkmark	
	3.12.1. Number of incidents of diversion related to international transfers:		
	3.12.1.1. Details:		
	Suspected incidents of diversion are investigated and, if necessary, prosecuted under applicable legislation.		
	Actions taken during the reporting period		
[PoA II.6]	3.13. During the reporting period, was action taken against groups or individuals engaged in transferring SALW illegally (e.g. prosecution)	\checkmark	
	3.13.1. Details:		
	Investigations were undertaken on persons illegally importing firearms into Australia and charges laid.		
	International assistance		
[PoA III.6]	3.14. Does your country wish to request assistance in developing laws, regulations or administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the export, import, transit or retransfer of SALW? [if no, go to 4.1.]		$\overline{\checkmark}$
	3.14.1. What kind of assistance do you require?		
	3.14.2 Has your country developed a project proposal for assistance in this regard? [possible to upload relevant files in Section 10]		

Section 4: Brokering

Sources	Question	Yes	No
	Laws, regulations and administrative procedures		
[PoA II.14]	4.1. Does your country have laws, regulations and/or administrative procedures governing brokering of SALW? [if no, go to 4.2]	\checkmark	
	4.1.1. List laws and/or administrative procedures regulating SALW brokering in your country.		
	Under the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, persons intending to conduct brokering activities need to be registered as brokers with the Department of Defence, and are required to apply for permits to conduct brokering activities, which will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.		
	4.1.2. Does your country require registration of SALW brokers?	\checkmark	
	4.1.3. Does your country require a licence, permit or other authorisation for each brokering transaction?	\checkmark	
GGE Report para 44	4.2. Does your country regulate activities that are closely associated with the brokering of SALW?	\checkmark	
	4.2.1. If so which of the following activities are regulated when undertaken in connection with the brokering of SALW (check relevant boxes)?		
	a) Acting as dealers or agents	\checkmark	
	b) Providing technical assistance		
	c) Training		
	d) Transport		
	e) Freight forwarding		
	f) Storage		
	g) Finance		
	h) Insurance		
	i) Maintenance		
	j) Security		
	k) Other services:		
	[if other, please explain]		
	Actions taken during the reporting period		
RevCon3	4.2 During the constitution and discount of the constitution of th		
outcome II. A.1(c)20	4.3. During the reporting period, was action taken against groups or individuals engaged in illegal brokering (e.g. prosecution)?		\checkmark
	4.3.1. Details: [if yes]		

	International assistance	
[PoA III.6]	4.4. Does your country wish to request assistance in developing laws, regulations and/or administrative procedures to regulate SALW brokering? [if no, go to 5.1]	\subseteq
	4.4.1. What kind of assistance do you require?	
	4.4.2. Has your country developed a project proposal for assistance in this regard?	

Section 5: Stockpile management

Sources	Question	Yes	No
	Laws, regulations and administrative procedures		
[PoA II.17]	5.1. Does your country have standards and procedures relating to the management and security of SALW held by the armed forces, police or any other entity authorised to hold SALW? [if no, go to 5.2]	\square	
[PoA II.17]	5.1.1. If so, which of the following provisions are included in these standards and procedures (check relevant boxes)?		
	a) Appropriate locations for stockpiles	\subseteq	
	b) Physical security measures	\subseteq	
	c) Control of access to stocks	\subseteq	
	d) Inventory management and accounting control	\subseteq	
	e) Staff training	\subseteq	
	f) Security, accounting and control of SALW held or transported by operational units or authorised personnel	\checkmark	
	g) Procedures and sanctions in the event of theft or loss	\subseteq	
	h) Other:		
	[if other, please explain]		
	Surplus		
[PoA, II.18]	5.2. When stocks are identified as surplus, what actions does your country take with regard to the surplus (check relevant boxes)?		
	a) Officially declare as surplus	\subseteq	
	b) Take out of service	\subseteq	
	c) Record by type, lot, batch, and serial number	\subseteq	
	d) Store separately	\subseteq	
	e) Other:		
	[if other, please explain]		
	Surplus		
[PoA, II.18]	5.3. In disposing of the surplus stocks, which of the following methods may be used (check relevant boxes)?		
	a) Destruction	\subseteq	
	b) Sale to another State		
	c) Donation to another State		
	d) Transfer to another state agency		

	e) Sale to civilians		
	f) Sale or transfer to legal entities (e.g. museums, private security companies, etc.)		
	g) Other:		
	[if other, please explain]		
	Diversion		
[RevCon3 outcome II. A.1(c)20]	5.4. Does your country collect information on incidents of diversion related to national stockpile management?	V	
	5.4.1. Number of incidents of diversion related to stockpile management:		
	5.4.1.1. Details:		
	Suspected incidents of diversion are investigated and, if necessary, prosecuted under applicable legislation.		
	Actions taken during the reporting period		
[PoA II.19]	5.5. During the biennial reporting period, has your country destroyed surplus stocks? [if no, go to 5.4]		
	5.5.1. How many SALW were destroyed?		
	i) First reporting year (2018)		
	ii) Second reporting year (2019)		
[RevCon3			
outcome II. A.3(b)46]	5.5.2. Any good practice regarding destruction (e.g. detatils on method of destruction [burning, melting, cutting, crushing, others: specify])?		
	SALW that have been categorised as obsolete or as beyond economic repair are routinely destroyed by supervised industrial shredding. Information on quantities of SALW destroyed is not released by the Australian Defence Force.		
	International assistance		
[PoA II.29: III.6]	5.6. Does your country wish to request assistance in developing standards and procedures on stockpile management? [if no, go to 5.5]		\subseteq
	5.6.1. What kind of assistance do you require?		
	5.6.2. Has your country developed a project proposal for assistance in this regard?		
	International assistance		
[PoA III.6: 14]	5.7. Does your country wish to request assistance in developing capacity for the destruction of weapons? [if no, go to 6.1]		\subseteq
	5.7.1 What kind of assistance do you require?		

5.7.2. Has your country developed a project proposal for assistance in this regard?	
[possible to upload relevant files in Section 10]	

Section 6: Collection

Sources	Question	Yes	No
	Collection		
[RevCon3			
Outcome II.		\checkmark	
B.1]	6.1. During the reporting period, did your country collect any SALW ? [if no, go to 6.2]		
	6.1.1. How many SALW were collected? [click No if data is not available: go to 6.2]		
	i) First reporting year (2018)		
	66716		
	ii) Second reporting year (2019)		
	56284		
	6.1.1.1. What action was taken with respect to the SALW collected? Provide		

6.1.1.1. What action was taken with respect to the SALW collected? Provide numbers of weapons collected. [click No if data is not available: go to 6.2]

	SALW collected		
Year	i) First reporting year (2018)	ii) Second reporting year (2019)	
6.1.1. Collected	66716	56284	
6.1.1. Action taken			
a) Marked			
b) Recorded	66716	56284	
c) Destroyed	29267	16973	
d) Trace request issued			
e) Other action [specify]:Released, transferred or re-exported - see note	19127	16944	
f) No action taken (only stored)	17621	23071	

6.1.1.2. If further breakdown of collected SALW is available, specify and provide numbers: [click No if data is not available: go to 6.2]

Year	i) First reporting year (2018)	ii) Second reporting year (2019)
a) How many SALW were seized?	25206	25364
b) How many SALW were surendered?	10909	9878
c) How many SALW were found?	842	756

6.1.1.3 What action was taken with respect to the SALW seized, surrendered or found? Specify and provide numbers. [click No if data is not available: go to 6.2]

	SALW seized		SALW surrendered		SALW found	
Year	i) First reporting year (2018)	ii) Second reporting year (2019)	i) First reporting year (2018)	ii) Second reporting year (2019)	i) First reporting year (2018)	ii) Second reporting year (2019)
6.1.1.2. seized / surrendered / found	25206	25364	10909	9878	842	756
6.1.1.3 Action taken						
a) Marked						
b) Recorded	21033	20782	8997	8286	424	345
c) Destroyed	2912	540	2433	1712	72	40
d) Trace request issued						
e) Other action: [specify]Sold via dealer/returned to owner or next of kin	16188	18437	5994	5703	347	291
f) No action taken (only stored)						

6.1.1.4. Details (e.g. types of weapons) [possible to upload relevant files in Section 10]

Number of trace requests to the ACIC since January 1 2018 = 2,588 Details for SALW collected: other action. 2018: 15248 released; 3774 transferred; 16 re-exported, 89 not specified; 2019: 13401 released; 3501 transferred, 3 re-exported, 39 not specified; Note: National Report will be resubmitted if SALW tables are changed.

International assistance

[PoA III.6]	6.2. Does your country wish to request assistance in building capacity for collection of the illicit SALW? [if no, go to 7.1]	\subseteq
	6.2.1. What kind of assistance do you require?	
	6.2.2. Has your country developed a project proposal for assistance in this regard? [possible to upload relevant files in Section 10]	

Sources	Question	Yes	No
	Marking		
[ITI 8d]	7.1 Does your country take measures to ensure that all SALW in the possession of government armed and security forces for their own use are duly marked? [if no, go to 7.2]		
	7.1.1. Describe the markings that are applied to government-held stocks.		
	In addition to serial number markings, strict control measures apply to military weapons, munitions and explosives. All SALW have a unique serial number stamped or engraved. SALW and controlled accessories in the Australian Defence Force inventory also have a Unique Identification (UID) tag applied.		
[ITI 8c]	7.1.2. When government stocks are transferred to civilians or private companies in your territory, are such stocks marked to indicate that your government transferred the stocks?		
	Marking		
[ITI 8e]	7.2. Does your country encourage manufacturers of SALW to develop measures against the removal or alteration of markings?	\subseteq	
	7.2.1. Details: [if yes]		
	The limited production of small arms in Australia is underpinned by modern technology and access to the latest in-house (and external) processes. Manufacturing of firearms in Australia (predominantly for military and law enforcement use) is governed by a robust legal system underpinned by a competent law enforcement capacity. The very few entities involved in the manufacturing of firearms are aware of the need to (as much as technically possible) inhibit the removal of markings from their products.		
	Those who assemble firearms within Australia utilise firearm frames or receivers manufactured externally to Australia, and as such there is no capacity by Australian industry participants to influence their design. Since 2002 Australia has implemented measures requiring firearms be marked with enough information to identify firearms procured externally. The measures impose severe penalties for defacing serial numbers or being in possession of a firearm which has had its markings defaced.		
	Marking		
[RevCon3 II.A.4]	7.3. In its marking practice, does your country take into account developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design (e.g. modular weapons, the use of new materials and 3D printing)?	\checkmark	
	7.3.1 Details: [if yes]		
	The ACIC National Firearm Trace Program records the markings located on major components which have been used to assemble an illicit firearm. These markings (including serial numbers) are cross checked with other firearm markings on other illicit firearms recorded during the 16 years of firearm tracing by the ACIC.		
	T. 6		

Information on national marking practice

[ITI 31]

7.4. Pursuant to paragraph 31 of the International Tracing Instrument, States will provide the following information, updating it when necessary: a) National marking practices related to markings used to indicate country of manufacture and/or country of import as applicable.

Australia has a very small firearm manufacturing industry, with only one major company manufacturing both for the Australian military and the smaller sporting arms market (Thales Australia). Some custom gunsmiths assemble complete firearms using firearm frames/receivers legally imported from other countries. This assembly activity is not regarded as 'manufacturing' in Australia as the frame/receiver has been manufactured by other parties.

The marking of firearms legally imported into Australia is done by way of requiring there is a unique serial number applied to the firearm. Where there is no number the importer is required to have a serial number applied to the firearm. Australia requires registration of all firearms (including air rifles) and as such the unique serial number (factory applied or other), along with an accurate set of descriptors, is used to identify for the purposes of registration.

Australia has developed a National Firearm Identification Database (NFID) which is used to allocate a uniform set of descriptors to those firearms both registered and those located in the illicit market. This process assist in the enhanced identification of firearms within Australia. The NFID also records such markings as importer markings, geographical markings and ordnance codes, satisfying the law enforcement communities need to be able to identify a firearm.

The NFID has been created with the assistance of the firearm industry and the USA Bureau of Firearms Alcohol Tobacco & Explosives (ATF). In recent years some large Australian firearm importers have had their products marked at the point of manufacture with their names and addresses. This practice is purely voluntary and reflects industries willingness to ensure identification of their firearms is enhanced.

Illegal removal of any marking which is used to identify a firearm is illegal in all states and territories, as well as possession of a firearms which has had it's registration markings removed or defaced. Australia has a very robust system of firearm management, with a strong focus of the correct identification of firearms at registration.

[RevCon3 outcome III.E.20]

Such information should be shared with INTERPOL to be included in relevant databases (www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases).

Record keeping

[PoA II.9]

7.5. Does your country have standards and procedures related to keeping of records for all marked SALW in its territory? [if no, go to 7.6]

 $\sqrt{}$

7.5.1. What records relating to SALW are kept by the State (e.g. manufacturing, brokering, import and export licences granted, sales to other States, SALW held by State agencies such as the armed forces etc)?

Records are maintained of all firearms that are registered in Australia, including details of the firearms and their current and previous owners. Records vary considerably according to each State and Territory Police Force. The Australian Defence Force maintains an inventory management system that details the location, holding unit of each SALW and controlled accessory by type and serial number.

[ITI 12 a,b]

7.5.2. How long does the government keep such records? [please detail]

	Records are kept for a minimum of / years, but generally kept indefinitely.	
[ITI 13]	7.5.3. In the event that they go out of business, are companies engaged in SALW activities (e.g. manufacturing, importing, exporting etc) required to submit all records held by them to the government?	
	International assistance	
[PoA III.6, ITI 27]	7.6. Does your country wish to request assistance in building capacity for marking and/or record-keeping? [if no, go to 8.1]	\subseteq
	7.6.1. What kind of assistance do you require?	
	7.6.2. Has your country developed a project proposal for assistance in this regard? [possible to upload relevant files in Section 10]	

Section 8: International tracing

Sources	Question	Yes	No
	Laws, regulations and administrative procedures		
[PoA II.10:			
ITI 14, 24]	8.1. Does your country have procedures in place to trace SALW? [if no, go to 8.2]		
	Tracing requests		
[ITI 25: 31a]	8.2. Which government agency is responsible for making a tracing request to another country?		
	Since 2005, the Australian Crime Commission (ACIC) has managed Australia's National Firearm Trace Program. The ACIC has represented Australia at a technical level at multiple UN PoA-ITI meetings and has presented on various techical issues concerning firearm identification and tracing. The ACIC engages with various intenational law enforcement agence is in regard to firearm tracing.		
	Tracing requests		
[ITI 17]	8.3. What information does the designated agency include in a tracing request? (check relevant boxes)		
	a) Circumstances under which the SALW was found	\checkmark	
	b) Reasons why the SALW is considered to be illegal or illicit	\checkmark	
	c) The intended use of the information being sought		
	d) Any markings on the SALW	\subseteq	
	e) Type/calibre of SALW	\subseteq	
	f) Other:	\subseteq	
	[if other, please explain]		
	Full details of the firearm including, where available, clear digital images of markings and location of serial number.		
	Technologies for tracing		
[RevCon3 outcome III.F.25]	8.4. Has your country made use of technologies to improve tracing of illicit SALW?		
	Cooperation with INTERPOL		
[PoA II.37: ITI 33]	8.5. During the reporting period, has your country cooperated on the issue of tracing SALW with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)?		
	International assistance		
[PoA III.9]	8.6. Does your country wish to request assistance in developing procedures to trace SALW? [if no, go to $9.1]$		\checkmark
[PoA II.36: III.6:ITI 27]	8.6.1. What kind of assistance do you require?		

8.6.2. Has your country developed a project proposal for assistance in this regard?	
oto 2.11 ms your country at vereped a project proposal for assistance in and regard.	
Ipossible to upload relevant files in Section 101	

Section 9: International cooperation and assistance

Sources	Question	Yes	No
	Assistance requested/received/provided		
[PoA III.3, 6]	9.1. During the reporting period, in addition to the assistance requested/received mentioned in the Sections 2-8 above, has your country requested / received / provided assistance to implement the PoA and ITI? [if no, go to 10.1]		
	9.1.1. If so, in what areas (check relevant boxes)?		
	a. Establishing/designating National Coordination Agency/National Point of Contact and National Action Plan		
	a) Nature of the assistance:		
	i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)		
	ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)		
	b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial):		
	c) Description of the assistance activity:		
	d) Duration of the assistance provided/received:		
	e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance:		
	b. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)		
	a) Nature of the assistance:		
	i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)		
	ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)		
	b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial):		
	c) Description of the assistance activity:		
	d) Duration of the assistance provided/received:		
	e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance:		
	c. Capacity-building and training on SALW issues		
	Provided		

a) Nature of the assistance:

i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)

Provided

- ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)
- b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial):

AUD800,000 over two years, comprising AUD400,000 - UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) (AUD200,000 in 2018 and AUD200,000 in 2019), AUD400,000 to the Centre for Armed Violence Reduction (AUD250,000 in 2018, AUD150,000 in 2019)

c) Description of the assistance activity:

UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR): to support the preparation for ratification and implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty and to ensure the complementarities of implementation activities of the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA). Centre for Armed Violence Reduction (CAVR): to support the preparation for ratification and implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, strengthen compliance with the UNPOA and assist with training and registry development for small arms and light weapons control in the Pacific.

d) Duration of the assistance provided/received:

2018 and 2019

e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance:

A number of States received assistance as part of the multi-donor funding in UNSCAR. CAVR provided assistance to multiple states.

- d. Law enforcement
 - a) Nature of the assistance:
 - i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)
 - ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)
 - b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial):
 - c) Description of the assistance activity:
 - d) Duration of the assistance provided/received:
 - e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance:
- e. Customs and borders
 - a) Nature of the assistance:
 - i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)
 - ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)
 - b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial):

- c) Description of the assistance activity: d) Duration of the assistance provided/received: e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance: f. Research Provided a) Nature of the assistance: i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate) Provided ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate) b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial): AUD850,000 over two years, comprising: Small Arms Survey AUD650,000 (AUD250,000 in 2018 and AUD 400,000 in 2019), ATT Monitor AUD200,000 (AUD100,000 in 2018 and AUD100,000 in 2019). c) Description of the assistance activity: As a global centre of excellence, the Small Arms Survey generates evidence-based, impartial, and policy-relevant knowledge and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and civil society. ATT Monitor is undertaking research on the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. Baseline Survey is a tool created to facilitate the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. d) Duration of the assistance provided/received: 2018 and 2019 e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance: Small Arms Survey; Control Arms (for the production of the Arms Trade Treaty Monitor) g. Gender considerations / women, men, girls and boys a) Nature of the assistance: i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate) ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate) b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial):

c) Description of the assistance activity:

d) Duration of the assistance provided/received:

- e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance:
- h. Awareness-raising
 - a) Nature of the assistance:
 - i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)
 - ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)
 - b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial):
 - c) Description of the assistance activity:
 - d) Duration of the assistance provided/received:
 - e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance:
- i. Organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism

Provided

- a) Nature of the assistance:
 - i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)
 - ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)

Provided

- b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial):
- c) Description of the assistance activity:
- 1. Australia's maritime presence in the Middle East promotes broader regional security by deterring piracy and disrupting the illicit trafficking of people, drugs, weapons and money that support international terrorist networks. 2. Through the Resolute Support mission, the ADF supports the institutional capacity building of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Elements of the train, advise, assist mission include logistics support, for example assistance in planning convoy operations including protecting against the threat of hijacking of supplies and weapons stores.
- 3. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has provided armouries support to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). The Australian Defence Staff Warrant Officer Works coordinates the Armoury and Magazine maintenance inspections. The maintenance inspection is undertaken with the PNGDF Defence Intelligence Branch Warrant Officer and several contractors. The activity reduces the likelihood of the theft of weapons from the PNGDF and it gives Australian Defence Staff personnel access to armouries and magazines that would not normally occur if this activity was not undertaken.

There are eight armouries and seven magazines located at PNGDF Bases around Papua New Guinea, all of which have the Challenger – Version 8 and 10 Intruder Alarm System installed. All sites require the alarm systems be inspected and repaired to full functionality. The location of the repair and maintenance works to be conducted will be at the following locations: a. Taurama Barracks – Port Moresby

- b. Murray Barracks Port Moresby c. Moem Barracks Wewak d. Goldie River Training Depot – Port Moresby e. Kiunga Forward Operating Base – Kiunga f. Igam Barracks – Lae g. Her Majesty's Papua New Guinea Ship (HMPNGS) – Manus Island
- d) Duration of the assistance provided/received:
- e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance:
- j. Other

Provided

Specify:

Armouries Maintenance - Australian Defence Force

- a) Nature of the assistance:
 - i) financial: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)
 - ii) technical: Requested/Received/Provided (select appropriate)

Provided

- b) Amount of assistance provided/received (if financial):
- c) Description of the assistance activity:

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has provided armouries support to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). The Australian Defence Staff Warrant Officer Works coordinates the Armoury and Magazine maintenance inspections. The maintenance inspection is undertaken with the PNGDF Defence Intelligence Branch Warrant Officer and several contractors. The activity reduces the likelihood of the theft of weapons from the PNGDF and it gives Australian Defence Staff personnel access to armouries and magazines that would not normally occur if this activity was not undertaken.

There are eight armouries and seven magazines located at PNGDF Bases around Papua New Guinea, all of which have the Challenger – Version 8 and 10 Intruder Alarm System installed. All sites require the alarm systems be inspected and repaired to full functionality. The location of the repair and maintenance works to be conducted will be at the following locations: a. Taurama Barracks – Port Moresby

- b. Murray Barracks Port Moresby c. Moem Barracks Wewak d. Goldie River Training Depot Port Moresby e. Kiunga Forward Operating Base Kiunga f. Igam Barracks Lae g. Her Majesty's Papua New Guinea Ship (HMPNGS) Manus Island 2. Through the Resolute Support mission, the ADF has trained, advised and assisted the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces with the appropriate handling and storage of their weapons.
- d) Duration of the assistance provided/received:
- e) State(s) or organization(s) that provided/received the assistance:

Papua New Guinea

Section 10: Gender and additional information

Sources	Question	Yes	No
	Gender considerations		
[RevCon3 outcome]	10.1. Does your country take into account gender considerations? [If yes, click where applicable]	\checkmark	
[RevCon3 II.B.2.73]	10.1.1. Increase understanding of the gender-specific impacts of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (training, workshops, gender-analysis)		
[RevCon3 II.B.2.74]	10.1.2. Promote the meaningful participation and representation of women in policymaking, planning and implementation processes related to the implementation of the PoA, including their participation in national small arms commissions		
[BMS6.I.61]	10.1.3. Seriously consider increasing funding for policies and programmes that take account of the differing impacts of illicit small arms and light weapons on women, men, girls and boys		
[RevCon3 outcome II.B.2.76]	10.1.4. Mainstream gender dimensions into your implementation efforts		
[RevCon3 outcome II.B.2.76]	10.1.5. Exchange national experiences, lessons learned and best practices on the mainstreaming gender dimensions into policies and programmes		
[RevCon3 outcome II.B.2.65]	10.1.6. Ensure coordination on the implementation of the PoA between relevant national small arms authorities with other national authorities working on gender equality		
[RevCon3 outcome II.B.2.75]	10.1.7. Ensure coordination on the implementation of the PoA between relevant national authorities and women's civil society groups		
[RevCon3 outcome II.B.2.75]	10.1.8. Others. Specify:		
	The Commonwealth, states and territories governments manage and participate in various fora regarding policymaking, planning and implementation processes related to the Programme of Action. The central group - which reports to senior officials and ministers - is the Firearms and Weapons Policy Working Group (FWPWG) . The FWPWG comprises relevant officers from Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement and justice agencies.		
	These officers work together to implement and uphold the National Firearms Agreement, provide policy advice on issues specifically referred by ministers, senior officials or other working groups, and consider emerging and nationally significant firearms and weapons policy issues identified by the Working Group's members. The group is currently made up of 17 women (representing approximately 36 percent) and 30 men (representing approximately 64 percent).		

The FWPWG conducted a review of the National Firearms Agreement from 2015 –2017. As part of the review, firearms industry, community group and public health advocates were consulted. A number of organisations that advocate for the protection of women and girls - including the Alannah and Madeline Foundation, the Australian Crime Prevention Council and the Victims of Crime Assistance League - were invited to partake.

More broadly, Australia considers violence against women and girls, including through the use of small arms and light weapons – is a gross violation of human rights. It has a profound and devastating impact on its victims, on communities, and on society as a whole. We consider violence against women and girls to include intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence, non partner sexual assault, female genital mutilation, sexual exploitation and trafficking, and harmful practices such as bride price and sorcery accusation related violence.

While small arms and light weapons may be used in conducting such violent acts, it may be perpetrated in other ways, being used as a weapon in itself, and as such our approach to ending violence against women and girls is broader than one specific weapon type. Ending violence against women and girls in particular, is a high priority for Australia domestically and in our international efforts. It requires co-ordinated approaches across justice/policing, health and other services essential to women's safety and physical, emotional and mental well-being.

It also requires transformation of the structures, systems and social norms that embed gender inequality. Australia supports an evidence-based approach to ending violence against women and girls, particularly in relation to activities aimed at prevention. The Australian Government has committed \$340 million towards the Fourth Action Plan of the National Plan to Reduce Violence Against Women and their Children (2010-2022).

This includes funding to improve and build on frontline services to keep women and children safe, to provide safe places for people impacted by domestic and family violence, and for prevention strategies to eradicate domestic and family violence. The Fourth Action Plan contains 20 actions across five national priority areas, which represent the range of responses required to tackle domestic, family and sexual violence.

Since 2013, the Australian Government has provided over \$1 billion to prevent and address family and domestic violence in Australia. In November 2019, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) released an independent evaluation of the impact of Australia's efforts to Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (EVAWG). The evaluation showed that Australia has provided strong international leadership to eliminate gender-based violence, and is a major global contributor to reducing violence against women and girls, having delivered more than \$300 million over ten years (2008-2018) to support these efforts.

DFAT is working to implement the recommendations of the independent evaluation, including consideration of support for further programming focused on ending violence against women and girls in the Indo-Pacific, and development of a Framework for Action that will provide a ten-year roadmap for policy and programming focused on ending violence against women and girls. Australia's support for ending violence against women includes contributions to a number of global programs:

¬- the United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence against Women (\$6 million, 2016-19) ¬- the joint UN Program on Essential Services for Women and Girls Subject to Violence, helping to fill the gap in access to quality essential services for survivors of violence (\$3.75 million, 2015-19) ¬- a regional UN Population Fund initiative, kNOwVAWdata, which is institutionalising the expertise and capacity for conducting studies on the prevalence of violence against women (\$2.

6 million, 2016-20). Australia also supports a number of bilateral programs focused on ending violence against women and girls in the Indo-Pacific, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Vietnam and Pacific Island countries including Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Island, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. As a global leader on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), we take our commitment to the WPS agenda seriously, including through support for the United National Security Council resolution 1325 on WPS (2000) and eight subsequent resolutions, and adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

DFAT has commitments under the first National Action Plan on WPS including leading on the promotion of the WPS agenda internationally, including providing training and targeted briefings to posted departmental officers that addresses WPS and gender equality, and funding for a range of activities through the Australian development assistance program to support the WPS agenda. We integrate WPS principles into our development program, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Since March 2015, Australia has committed \$11 million to UN Women's two main WPS funds. DFAT has also provided \$4.15 million in funding for ICRC's Special Appeal to address Sexual Violence in Conflict (2014-2016; ongoing support is through core funding) and \$26.6 million (\$9.7 million in stage III, 2017 2019) to the SPRINT initiative to accelerate community recovery by providing crisis-affected women, men and children with lifesaving sexual and reproductive health services.

 \subseteq

Gender considerations

[RevCon3 outcome II.B.2.79]

ITI 31

10.2. Does your country collect disaggregated data on gender and SALW?

10.2.1 Details:

The Australian Bureau of Statistics collates and publishes gender- and age-disaggregated data on victims of crime, and data on weapon types used in selected crime types. Data is available from the Australian Bureau of Statistics to the end of the 2018 calendar year (further published data is not yet available at the time of reporting). See: https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4510.0Main+Features12018?OpenDocument

Additional information - Key challenges and opportunities

10.3. Any further comments on PoA and ITI, including key challenges and opportunities relating to the implementation of PoA and ITI, and national laws, regulations and administrative procedures?

Further information to Question 8.2 All data disseminated in relation to firearm traces by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) is released in accordance with the Australian Crime Commission Act (ACC Act). The ACIC is bound to only disseminate information to partner law enforcement agencies under the signature of an approved ACIC dissemination officer. The data released and all surrounding approvals are stored within the ACIC for future reference if required.

The information received from industry, both national and international is released to partner agencies on the understanding of those manufacturers that they are assisting law enforcement in the disruption of the illicit trafficking of firearms. All trace request data and resulting data is stored within the ACIC and used only for analysis of the illicit firearm market. Any such analysis is also subject to release provisions of the ACC Act.

Further information to Question 8.4: Australia has developed the National Firearm Identification Database to establish nationally accepted reference points for the accurate identification and recording of firearms. This process leads to a greater firearm data enhancement and reduces the possibility of firearms being diverted by misidentification.

a) Details

b) Please upload/attach additional files (e.g. views on the implementation of the PoA and ITI, a national action plan, project proposals, a list of projects implemented and financial contributions provided):

FILE-https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/poa-file-upload/AUS/2020/331256/National%20Firearms%20Agreement%20-%202017.pdf